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1. (Hereafter referred to as StEW.) Ingarden completed two volumes of this work
before his death in 1970, and a further volume has since been compiled from
manuscripts. Vol. I, Existentialontologie 1964; Vol. II, Formalontologie, Part 1,
Form und Wesen, Part 2, Welt und Bewußtsein, 1965; Vol. III, Über die kausale
Struktur der realen Welt, 1974; all published by Niemeyer, Tübingen. For a more
general account of Ingarden's project see G. Küng, “Zum Lebenswerk von Roman
Ingarden. Ontologie, Erkenntnistheorie und Metaphysik”, in Die Münchener
Phänomenologie, ed. H. Kuhn et al., Den Haag: Nijhoff, 1975, pp. 158–73. 
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§ 0. Introduction
The present paper may be conceived both as a working introduction to
certain aspects of the ontological theory put forward by the Polish
phenomenologist Roman Ingarden in his mammoth treatise Der Streit um
die Existenz der Welt,1 and also as a development of Ingarden’s views in
the light of current tendencies in analytic philosophical logic. The central
theme of the paper – though one which does not become apparent until
very near the end – is the ontological analysis of states of affairs, and in
particular of negative states of affairs, a topic which is of some specific
interest in forming a connecting link between the Brentano-Meinong-
Husserl tradition to which Ingarden belonged, and the (Frege)-Russell-
Wittgenstein tradition which gave rise to modern philosophical logic.
The first philosopher to have paid attention to the ontological
problems raised by negative states of affairs was Adolf Reinach, a
German disciple and colleague of Husserl, though one of many early
2. “Zur Theorie des negativen Urteils”, Münchener Philosophische Abhandlungen
(Lipps-Festschrift), Leipzig, 1911, cited according to the reprint in Reinach’s
Gesammelte Schriften, Halle: Niemeyer, 1921, (posthumously edited by H. Conrad-
Martius), pp. 56–102. 
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phenomenologists who, with Ingarden, found themselves unable to
follow Husserl’s move to a transcendental idealist position. Reinach
seems to have been highly regarded in his day, not least by Husserl
himself, though his philosophical output was lamentably small, his life
having been cut short by the First War. From the point of view of
present-day philosophy, and in particular of philosophical logic, he
recommends himself particularly because of the carefulness of his
terminology and the clarity of his style, which is crystaline when set in
comparison with that of other phenomenologists including, sadly,
Husserl himself. Apart from monographs on legal phenomenology,
including, for example, an analysis of the concept of criminal
premeditation, Reinach has left us also an essay of some 60 pages “On
the theory of the negative judgment”,2 and it is this essay which contains
the first published discussion of negative states of affairs. It appeared in
1911, that is to say three years before Russell’s lectures on negative facts
in Harvard, and two to three years before Wittgenstein was beginning to
move toward problems in this area in his logical notebooks.
Wittgenstein’s use of the German word Sachverhalt is interesting since,
given the rather peculiar philosophical genesis of this term, it points to
the existence of at least some connection between Wittgenstein and the
tradition to which Reinach belonged, for it was in that tradition that the
term arose. My interest in the possibility of a connection between
Reinach and Wittgenstein was sparked by a remark made at the
conference held two years ago in Warsaw to commemorate Ingarden’s
death by the co-author of the now standard English translation of the
Tractatus, Mr. Brian McGuinness, pointing to the startling similarities
which exist between the two philosopher’s uses of this term. Whilst, in
the present work, I come to no specific positive historical conclusions in
3. Cf. Stumpf, “Erscheinungen und psychische Funktionen”, Abhandlungen der
Berliner Akademie, 1907, p. 29, and Stumpf’s contribution to Philosophie der
Gegenwart in Selbstdarstellungen, 5, 1924, as trans. in C. Murchison, ed. History of
Psychology in Autobiography, Vol. I, pp. 389–441, esp. p. 421. Cf. also Reinach’s
Schriften, p. 81, n. 1. 
4. Logische Untersuchungen, 1st ed., Halle: Niemeyer, 2 vols, the 2nd in two parts,
1900/01, passim. 
5. See note 3 above.
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this regard, I do hope to show that some awareness of the more general
historical background is indispensible for the understanding of the purely
philosophical analysis of states of affairs. 
The term Sachverhalt was introduced into philosophy by Carl Stumpf
(who was, with Husserl, Meinong, Twardowski and Marty, a pupil of
Brentano) in the mimeographed logic lectures which Stumpf gave in
Halle in 1888.3 Its first important appearance in philosophical print was
in 1900 in volume I of Husserl’s Logical Investigations,4 a work
dedicated to Stumpf, with whom Husserl had worked in Halle. Husserl
does not, however, flag the innovatory nature of this term, something
which is explained partly by the nature of the German language as a kind
of linguistic construction kit, partly by the vagaries of Husserl’s prose,
and finally by the fact that, 12 years after Stumpf’s first use, the term
was already beginning to acquire the naturalness and the familiarity
which – given the ontological propriety of the underlying notion – it has
since shown that it deserves. Stumpf himself first went into print with the
term after he had left Halle and gone (through Munich) to Berlin, in a
monograph for the Berlin Academy which appeared in 1907,5 just about
the time when Wittgenstein was settling himself in the Berlin Technische
Hochschule. 
Apart from Husserl, Reinach and Stumpf, other pre-Tractarian
occurrences of Sachverhalt seem to be of less importance in the present
6. Cf. my contribution to the proceedings of the 2nd international conference of the
Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, Kirchberg/Wechsel, Aug.-Sept. 1977.
[“Wittgenstein and the Background of Austrian Philosophy”, in E. Leinfellner, et al.,
eds., Wittgenstein and His Impact on Contemporary Thought, Vienna: Hölder-
Pichler-Tempsky, Dordrecht: Reidel, 1978, 31–35.]
7. For the case of ‘state of affairs’, in particular, I have been unable to find any
occurrences in the philosophical-logical literature prior to the use by Ogden and
Ramsey in their translation of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, London: Routledge, 1922,
where it translates certain occurrences of ‘Sachlage’. 
8. Interestingly the original use of ‘sake’ (supported in the OED by quotations from
1000 to 1590) was as an independent substantive. ‘State of things’ in its present
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context.6 But what of the possibility that Wittgenstein acquired the term
from none of these authors; might he not have coined it himself,
independently of their work? This suggestion must, I think, be rejected,
and for reasons which may have some more general light to throw on the
genesis of philosophical terminology, whether within a single language
or by an absorption from a second laguage of the type which seems to
have occurred with regard to the English term ‘state of affairs’. It is
difficult for philosophers working today to appreciate the extent to which
their use of both Sachverhalt and state of affairs is a relatively modern
innovation.7 (The relevant volume of OED, for example, published in
1919, lists the joint catchword ‘state of things, state of affairs’ but
provides, under this head, quotations of ‘state of things’ only). Perhaps
we can convey the degree of innovation involved by means of an
analogy with the word ‘sake’. The occurrences of ‘sake’ in English are
exclusively syncategorematic, bound up with the construction ‘for X’s
sake’. ‘State of affairs’ also seems to have been bound up, though more
loosely, with constructions such as ‘this (the jumble in my office) is a
pretty state of affairs’. The move to a philosophical use of ‘state of
affairs’ not only as categorematic but further as denoting entitities over
which one can quantify, would, we suggest, at least parallel a move to
quantification over sakes.8 A parallel analogy holds, I believe, for the
syncategorematic use outside philosophy may also be parasitic upon a former
meaning, as system of divine government during a particular era, that is ‘state [or
government] of things’ (OED, quotation for 1387). The parallel between these two
uses of ‘sake’ and ‘state of things or affairs’ receives further support from the lack
of a developed plural form for either, for the possibility of counting independent
entities clearly goes hand in hand with quantification over those entities and with the
presence of linguistic machinery for referring to them individually. 
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German term Sachverhalt, and it seems that it would be an unreasonable
hypothesis to suppose that a quantificational jump of this size was made
independently by Stumpf and Wittgenstein within a short space of time,
relative to one and the same term.
§ 1. From Ontology to Formal Ontology
The philosophical-logical tradition to which the early Brentano, the early
Husserl, Meinong, Stumpf, Reinach and Ingarden belong has been
virtually superseded by another, much looser tradition, inaugurated by
Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein. But it might not be too late to reflect
upon whether this supersession is in all respects justified, whether we
have not accepted too readily the surface virtues of the new, throwing
out with the bathwater of the old something which ought to be preserved.
The two traditions share a common realist approach to ontology,
thereby standing in joint opposition to the Hegelian and Bradleyan
idealism which went before them and to the excesses of subjectivist and
linguistic idealism which have flourished since, especially in French
phenomenological writings and in the works of some ordinary language
philosophers. But they differ in their interpretation of the demands of an
adequate ‘realism’: roughly speaking the adherents of Frege-Russell-
Wittgenstein philosophical ontology suppose that their realism is
compatible with reductionsm, that philosophical progress is to be
measured, indeed, by the degree to which one can ‘explain away’
apparent philosophical givens in terms of less controversial entities;
adherence to (early)Brentano-(early)Husserl-Ingarden philosophical
9. (And even then nothing, ontologically speaking, gets lost.)
10. See especially I. Angelelli, Studies on Gottlob Frege and Traditional Philosophy,
Dordrecht: Reidel, 1967, p. 53. 
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ontology on the other hand is characterized by the most painstaking
faithfulness to all that is given in experience, on any ontological level;
the members of this tradition can countenance ‘reduction’ only where
this is motivated by reductive interconnections which are themselves
given in experience.9 
The presence of a reductivist-pragmatic attitude in Frege’s work, his
willingness to regard as identical entities which are merely equivalent for
some specified purpose, has often been noted in the literature.10 This
tendency on Frege’s part was so consolidated in post-Fregean writings
that it came to be taken for granted by virtually all philosophers.
Ockham’s perfectly uncontroversial razor: thou shalt not multiply
entities without necessity, was perverted into: thou shalt deny entities
wherever possible, that is to say, wherever compatible with one’s
particular short-term philosophical purposes. This perversion was not
without its motives. Simply put: certain huge successes of the Frege-
Russell-Wittgenstein approach in its original conception led its adherents
to countenance, and even to welcome, a certain blatant inadequacy in
other areas, particularly in ontology. These successes lay all of them in
the area of logic or, which is related to this, in the area of the philosophy
of mathematics. They were first of all of a technical nature: with Frege’s
Begriffsschrift formal logic made its first substantial strides forward
since the time of Aristotle, and further strides continued to be made
throughout the first half of the present century. Secondly they concerned
the application of formal-logical methods directly to ontology, and
especially to the ontology of mathematics. Anyone who has studied these
early, faltering applications will yet appreciate, I hope, that the formal
logical methods invented by, say, Frege, Wittgenstein, Lesniewski and
Carnap are indispensable to the practice of ontology. For with the aid of
11. It is necessary to distinguish the use of the term ‘formal ontology’ on the part of
analytic philosophical logicians such as Cocchiarella (see n. 17) from Ingarden’s use
in StEW, even though there is a welcome overlap between the two sets of activities.
For Ingarden, ontology is divided into formal, existential and material ontology,
according to the type of ontological moments on the side of the entities themselves
which the philosopher is investigating: these may be formal (differences, e.g.
between individual and higher-order objects, their properties and relations, and the
states of affairs they co-constitute); existential (where we distinguish various modes
of being, e.g. real, ideal or purely intentional being); or material, (a matter of
temporality, causality, etc.). ‘Formal ontology’ as employed by analytic philosophers
connotes the use of formal methods, i.e. of mathematical logic; however, there is
nothing in Ingarden’s project which would rule out the use of such methods in its
detailed execution – the present author believes, indeed, that they will be seen to be
indispensable. 
12. This approach to (analytic) formal ontology is most cogently defended by N. B.
Cocchiarella, who regards his work as a continuation of that of Frege, Russell and
Gödel. See especially his “Existence Entailing Attributes, Modes of Copulation and
Modes of Being in Second Order Logic”, Nous, 3, 1969, pp. 33–48; “Properties as
Individuals in Formal Ontology”, Nous, 6, 1972, pp. 165–87; “Formal Ontology and
the Foundations of Mathematics”, in Bertrand Russell’s Philosophy, ed. G.
Nakhnikian, Duckworth Press, London, 1974, pp. 29–46. 
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such methods it becomes possible to carry what had been a stumbling
intuitive discipline to the level of a strict science: ontology is
transformed into formal ontology.11 It acquires a clearly delineated aim,
that of constructing artifical languages whose syntax will mirror in some
systematic way the structure of the universe, different syntactic types
corresponding to different formal-ontological categories, the relations
between the symbols of each type corresponding to relations between
entitites of the corresponding categories.12 Thus, trivially, if we use
capital Roman letters with superscripts to denote properties and relations,
lower case Roman letters to denote individual objects, then ‘P1a’ might
express the instantiation of the property P1 in the object a, ‘aR2 b’ the
holding of the relation R2 between the objects a and b, and so on. 
13. On the Leibnizian-Fregean notion of logic as a characteristica universalis see J.
van Heijenoort, “Logic as calculus or logic as language”, Boston Studies in the
Philosophy of Science, 3, 1967, 440–46, C. Thiel, Sense and Reference in Frege’s
Logic, Dordrecht: Reidel, 1968, Ch. 1. Wittgenstein refers to logic as a ‘great mirror’
in Notebooks 1914–16, Oxford: Blackwell, 1961, p. 39, and Tractatus 5.511. 
14. Cf. the discussions of categorical intuition in Husserl’s Logical Investigations,
especially Investigation VI, and the discussions of eidetic intuition in Husserl’s
Ideas, §§ 3–7, 21–23, 67–75, 136–145. 
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Formal ontology, then, is to result in a Leibnizian characteristica
universalis, a great mirror, which will reflect all of the various
existential, formal and material moments possessed by all of the various
different kinds of beings which there are in the universe.13 This is too
quick however. For what has not yet been made clear is what it is which
will provide the basis for the construction of this universal language.
Early formal ontologists were, I want to claim duped by the purely
technical strides being taken contemporaneously with their first
applications of logic to ontology, duped into the belief that the task of
construction could be carried out systematically and completely on the
basis of the solution of logical problems alone, problems, that is to say,
in the logical grammar of particular languages. The old tradition of
ontology had rested, in contrast, on a slowly growing storehouse of
ontological intuitions, and had consisted in informal, often simply
rhetorical arguments erected on these intuitions as basis. But it is an
index of the damage done to philosophy by the early, ill-considered, and
overspeedy introduction of formal-logical methods into philosophy that
appeals to intuition are invariably met with blank stares of horror from
the contemporary philosophical logical community. It is not my purpose
to provide a complete defence of intuition here, but note that one branch
of intuition which is perhaps more familiar than most is ordinary sensory
perception: our perceptions may mislead us, but this is no reason to
distrust every perception, nor to distrust the general model of perceptual-
geographical space which our sensory experience determines for us.14 
9A still more damaging consequence of the too quick introduction of
formal logic into philosophy was that the assumption that the logical
great mirror would have a degree and a type of simplicity comparable to,
say, the systems of Grundgesetze and Principia, led to a corresponding,
indeed precisely coordinated, simplification of the world, that is to say
of the subject-matter of the discipline of ontology. It has been easy for
critics of formal logic to argue that the subsequent methodological
Procrusteanisation perpetrated by, say, the logical positivists is an
inevitable consequence of the employment of formal methods as such.
I wish to claim, however, that this is not the case, that the two traditions
of Brentano-Husserl-Ingarden and Frege-Russell-Wittgenstein may be
re-united, in the construction of a truly adequate universal ontological
language. The novelty of this claim lies in its being associated with a
recognition – which cannot fail to be acquired by those who have
absorbed Ingarden’s works – of the fact that the logic involved in such
a language would have a complexity of a degree and of a type hitherto
wholly unfamiliar. For logicians have contented themselves with
investigating systems having a merely ‘mathematical’ complexity,
paying no attention to the unshapely kind of empirical complexity which
is demanded by adequate ontology, as by every other descriptive science.
Indeed, mathematical elegance and, correlatively, mathematical
deviance, for their own sake, must be seen to have as little role to play
in formal ontology as they do in, say, chemistry or microbiology. 
For the sake of irritation I have sometimes defended the view that the
foundational work which would be needed before this new great mirror
could be produced, that is to say, the detailed investigations of the
relationships between concrete and abstract individual and higher-order
objects, their porperties, relations, states of affairs, events and processes,
as well as between all of these and individual consciousnesses, their
thoughts, ideas, associated meanings, concepts, theories and so on,
would be of such complexity as to require several thousand years for its
15. Even the fifteen hundred pages of StEW which Ingarden managed to complete
contain only a very preliminary sketch of existential ontology, a developed formal
ontology only of what below are called ‘object entities’, and an unfinished first
contribution to the material-ontological analysis of causality. The necessary
investigations of the relationships between these three disciplines (see E. Swiderski,
“Some Salient Features of Ingarden’s Ontology”, Journal of the British Society for
Phenomenology, 6, 1975, 81–90) are merely hinted at in passing. 
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fulfilment.15 Three considerations may, perhaps, soften the effects of this
remark upon those who, like myself, want to do formal philosophy
already at this comparatively early stage. First of all, thanks to the work
of Aristotle, and the scholastics, Leibniz, Wolff, Herbart, Bolzano,
Lotze, Frege, Brentano, Meinong, Husserl, Mally Twardowski and
Ingarden, we are already in the position of having 2000 years of product
with which to begin. And secondly, precisely because logical theories of
such complexity will, in the future, be demanded by philosophers, it is
necessary that we push on with the work of producing and refining such
theories. Further, since complex formal systems can be grasped and then
correctly applied only by those who have interiorised principles of at
least an equivalent degree of complexity, it follows that philosophers
must continue to familiarise themselves with the best system that logic
has to offer at any given stage.
The danger is, of course, that this will lead once more to the creation
of an Ockhamist philosophical climate, that philosophers will once more
allow logic of a still-manageable degree of complexity to solidify, and
they will then fall into their old habits of reading off the contours of the
surrogate world implicitly defined by that logic, imposing them, in
Procrustean fashion, upon the world itself, which ought to form the
exclusive subject-matter of their inquiries. One way in which we can
ensure that this danger is avoided may be sketched as follows.
Philosophical logicians have assumed, under the pressure of exaggerated
Ockhamism, that they must compete with each other to produce theories
which have the very least ontological complexity which is required for
the solution of given problems or for the explanation of given
16. This ‘principle of non-miserliness’ is defended by G. Küng, “The World as
Noema and as Referent”, Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 3, 1972,
pp. 15–26, esp. p. 25 and “Ingarden on Language and Ontology”, Analecta
Husserliana, 2, 1972, pp. 204–17, esp. p. 214. 
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phenomena. My suggestion is that this process ought more properly to
be put into reverse, that philosophical logicians should be aiming rather
always to surpass each other in the production of systems ontologically
ever more complex, that the philosophical laurels should go not to he
who can explain important categories of entities away, but to the
philosopher who can provide convincing reasons for an extension of our
ontology, or who can provide arguments cogent enough to rescue entities
which have come to appear problematic, even though this will often lead
to a diminution in the ontological status which those entities are to be
conceived as possessing. We should adopt, that is to say, Bochenski’s
maxim: why make it simple, if it can be complicated?16 Taken seriously
this maxim would, of course, lead to an exaggeration as reprehensible as
that of the old perverted Ockhamism. But then the Bochenskian and not
the Ockhamist can appeal to the tailor’s defence: it is much easier to
fashion an acceptable suit of clothes from cloth which has been cut too
large than from insufficient cloth, or from cloth which has been cut too
quickly, and with greater attention to symmetry and rectilinearity than to
the shape of the body it is intended to fit.
It now becomes clear that ontologically rich formal languages are of
value precisely to the extent that they are developed on the basis of an
appeal to ontological intuitions. But the relationship between the
languages to be employed at any given stage and the battery of
ontological intuitions current at that stage is not by any means a simple
one. For intuitions divide themselves into secured intuitions, which are
taken for granted by all workers in a given field; and unsecured
intuitions, put forward tentatively as part of proposed solutions to
specific ontological problems. Let us assume that a given formal
ontological language, say Ln, is projected on the basis of the intuitions,
17. The great virtue of (analytic) formal ontology lies precisely here, that formal-
logical languages are determinate – even though provisional – objects of
investigation in a way in which (sometimes fragile) intuitions are not. 
18. Davidson’s essay on “The Logical Form of Action Sentences” in The Logic of
Decision and Action, N. Rescher, ed., Pittsburgh, 1967 and the literature which has
followed in its wake consists, in effect, in investigations in the ontology of events.
Events (weddings, crap games, sneezings, splittings [of amoebae], etc.) fall into
various distinct ontological categories (see StEW, I, Ch. V, II/1, § 54, II/2, Ch. XIV)
and have various ontological relations between each other. In particular some events
are constituted out of others: they exhibit the kind of stratificational ordering
discussed in 3,4 in relation to object-entities in general. The question which we
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whether secured or unsecured, which we have concerning a certain
subject-matter at a given stage n. We then experiment in various ways
with Ln, e.g. we attempt to express with formal precision ontological
arguments hitherto developed pre-formally or we investigate how far Ln
might suggest solutions to open ontological problems in the given area.17
Such experiments, whether they result in relative failure or success, lead
to a rejection of some of our initial intuitions and to a sharpening of
others, and thereby to a new, more adequate language, Ln+1. Eventually
we gain a familiarity with Ln+1, that is, we interiorise its associated
underlying ontological theory, and thereby the secured intuitions, which
had been explicitly and shamefacedly tentative at the nth stage, take their
place as parts of the background of our new, more adequate ontology.
The principles involved now come to be taken for granted; they
determine a space within which new, once more tentative intuitions can
be developed and tested, the procedure then repeating itself through
future stages.
This account involves, of course, much that is oversimplification.
There will be, in general not one, clear, evolving sequence of languages
and associated formal-ontological theories, but branches and conflicts,
illusions and setbacks of the type which we find in every science.
Consideration of the history of formal ontology from the Tractatus
through Carnap and Bermann to, say, Davidson18 and Cocchiarella,
would raise, is whether the logical analysis of event/action discourse ought not to be
recognised as having a methodologically secondary role in relation to the direct
ontological analysis of events/actions as such. 
19. Frege frequently speaks, especially in his later works, of a ‘realm of sense’, a
‘realm of reference’, and even of a ‘realm of word and sentence’: see his essay on
“The Thought” (“Der Gedanke”), passim, on “Negation” (“Die Vereinung”), esp. p.
130, and, for further references, Thiel, Sense and Reference (cf. n. 13 above), pp.
150f. For a discussion of Frege’s ontology of realms and a rebuttal of Thiel’s
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suggests, however, that it embodies at least the kernel of what would be
a correct account.
§ 2. Meaning-entities vs. object-entities
When Stumpf introduced the term Sachverhalt he gave it the same sense
as Brentano’s term Urteilsinhalt or ‘judgment-content’, and related it
also to Bolzano’s Satz an sich, a term which is customarily translated as
‘proposition’ by Bolzano scholars. It therefore seems that the term stands
in close relation to the ‘conceptual content’ of Frege’s Begriffsschrift and
then also to the ‘sentential sense’ (‘thought’) of Frege’s semantical
writings. But it does not seem now to be possible to set Sachverhalte or
states of affairs alongside propositions or thoughts, to consign them, that
is to say, to what Frege called the ‘realm of senses’ as opposed to the
realm of ordinary referents (including the real world and its objects,
properties and relations). For the (surely by now well-justified) use of
this term, not only in Wittgenstein, Husserl, Reinach and Ingarden, but
also in standard analytic philosophical discussions of facts, is such as to
treat existing states of affairs as dovetailed, with objects, properties,
relations, events and processes, being that on the object side of things
which, directly or indirectly, make assertative sentences true or false.
These remarks point to a fundamental dichotomy, both terminological
and ontological, a dichotomy which was clearly seen for the first time by
Husserl in the Logical Investigations and which was hinted at by Frege
in his terminology of ‘realms’,19 a dichotomy which is important because
criticism thereof see my “Frege and Husserl: The Ontology of Reference”, Journal
of the British Society for Phenomenology, 9, 1978. 
20. Meinong’s objectives are entities which seem to hover, according to the role
which Meinong has in mind for them, from one side to the other of the
meaning/object line which we are here attempting to delineate. 
21. Cf. Dummett, Frege: Philosophy of Language, London: Duckworth, 1973, p.
153. 
22. In his Person and Object, London: Allen and Unwin, 1976, Chisholm puts
forward an account of states of affairs according to which propositions – in what
seems to be the familiar sense – are regarded as a sub-category of states of affairs
(see pp. 114–126). 
14
it has led to certain important confusions on the part of those
philosophers such as, we suggest, Meinong,20 Russell,21 and Chisholm,22
who have failed to appreciate its full significance. This dichotomy may
be expressed as follows:
Entities are divided into (at least) two categories, which we might call
the category of meaning-entities and the category of object-entities,
respectively.
Meaning Entities Object Entities
Senses Individual objects
Propositions (Sätze an sich)
Thoughts
Judgment-contents Higher–order objects 
23. ‘Concept’ here is not used in Frege’s sense, for concepts are regarded as the
senses, not the referents of predicate expressions. Note however that the kind of
ontological dichotomy involved is wholly Fregean in spirit. 
24. For a more detailed discussion see my “Frege and Husserl” (cf. n. 19 above). 
15
Concepts (conceptual contents)23
 
Properties 
Relations 
Theories 
(and other higher-order
meaning-structures)  States of Affairs 
Vorstellungen, ideas, images
Husserlian noemata 
Events
 Processes 
... ...
= realm of senses  = realm of (ordinary) referents 
Perhaps we can characterise the opposition involved here by saying that
meaning-entities are actualised in and form the content of our conscious
acts, especially conscious language-using acts, and that they thereby
form the medium of significant access to object-entities.24 The latter, on
the other hand, radically exclude the possibility of actualisation by
consciousness; object-entities can hold only the ‘target’ position for an
act. 
A marginal note which I might make here is that where valuable work
on object-ontology has been done by analytic philosophers, this has been
almost exclusively within the philosophy of mathematics, the solution of
problems in this area having brought forth many of the techniques and
insights which have shown themselves to be indispensable to formal
ontology in general. My conjecture is that this same service might be
provided for the theory of meaning-entities by considerations in the
16
philosophy of economics. For where mathematics provides a pocket
ontology, an object-universe within which many of the relations between
object-entities in general are mirrored in a controlled way, so economics
may provide a relatively isolated sphere of epistemic interaction (i.e.
between the beliefs, skills, habits, plans, desires and actions on the parts
of different subjects), interaction of just the kind which gives birth to
meaning-entities in general, wherever these may arise.
§ 3. The Stratification of the Universe of Objects
In the present paper we shall be concerned exclusively with object-
entities; we have introduced meaning-entities at all only to forestall the
possibility of certain kinds of ontological confusion which have hitherto
bedevilled discussions of negative states of affairs. For the latter, if they
exist at all, are certainly object-entities: they are that in the world to
which we are related when we understand negative sentences and not,
e.g. the meanings of those sentences. Before moving over to treat of this
specific topic however it is necessary to spend some time in making clear
to ourselves the scope of the category of object-entities as this is here
intended. Object-entities, first of all, need not be exclusively real spatio-
temporal physical things: numbers, at least those numbers which are
dealt with by the positive science of arithmetic, are object-entities.
Indeed, reflection on the notion of reference to individual objects reveals
that even for this restricted class of object-entities the familiar
identification of ontological status as real spatio-temporal existence is
illegitimate: a much more complex situation presents itself.
There are, for example, individual objects such as Sherlock Holmes
and the large cardinals of classical and non-classical set theories, which
have ontological status as objects even though they have no real
existence, are not embedded in the real world in the way in which, say,
President Carter is so embedded. Ingarden, virtually the only
distinguished pupil of Husserl to have survived both wars in the
continued exploration of Husserl’s original logical-philosophical
problems, developed an extremely detailed theory of the ontological
25. The theory is presented in StEW, II/1, Ch. IX and also, in more detail, in
Ingarden’s Das literarische Kunstwerk: Eine Untersuchung aus dem Grenzgebiet der
Ontologie, Logik und Literaturwissenschaft, Halle: Niemeyer, 1931, English
translation as The Literary Work of Art, Evanston: Northwestern U.P., 1973. 
26. I have defended an account of the mathematical work as a borderline case of the
literary work of art in “The Ontogenesis of Mathematical Objects”, Journal of the
British Society for Phenomenology, 6, 1975, 91–101 and in “Historicity, Value and
Mathematics”, Analecta Husserliana, 4, 1976, 219–40. 
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structure of literary works which involves, in particular, an analysis of
the form of the non-real created objects of fiction, an analysis which
provides the starting point for any account of the non-real regions of the
universe of object-entities.25 Ingarden points out that the individual
objects of fiction exhibit a peculiar ontological dependence upon certain
determinate networks of creative and re-creative acts of conscious
subjects, e.g. of the authors and readers of literary works. Unfortunately
precisely this ‘dependence’ upon consciousness has made it possible for
philosophical ontologists to decline to take them seriously: those areas
in which the clearest examples of non-existent individual objects occur,
namely fiction and creative mathematics,26 can both very easily be
considered e.g. from a purely linguistic point of view – Hamlet, et frères,
being explained away in terms of certain façons de parler – in a way in
which, say, the objects of chemistry or of gastronomy, cannot. But the
fact that we can provide satisfactory explanations of, say, the objectivity
of fiction or of the truths of set theory without making a move of
ontological ascent relative to the singular referring expressions of the
underlying linguistic structures does not mean that we have to be content
with such explanations. Indeed, once the move of ontological ascent is
made, then it becomes clear that many crucial ontological and
phenomenological features have been masked to linguistic philosophers
through being unmarked in the languages which, in our everyday pre-
ontological attitude, we have developed for the purposes of our
intercourse with such linguistic structures.
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But the refusal of ontological ascent implies, even more importantly,
a subsequent failure to apprehend an obvious generalisation of the
ontological theory of non-real objects, a generalisation which would
carry the kernel of the theory over into areas where a purely linguistic
approach in terms of façons de parler is not at our disposal. 
We have, on the one side, the real world with all its autonomous
individual objects, properties, states and so on, and on the other side the
purely intentional individual objects just discussed, objects whose
ontological status consists entirely in their being projected in uniform
ways by consciousnesses guided by linguistic structures of various types.
But now, besides these purely intentional objects there are also
intentional object-entities of other types, entities which arise through
certain operations of consciousness, in particular through various types
of demarcation, and which therefore owe their ontological status, at least
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in part, to appropriate networks of acts e.g. acts of classification or
scientific theory-building. But because “demarcations” are, ultimately,
demarcations of the autonomous real world, the entities which result
depend for their ontological status also upon the precise determinations
of that world – in a way in which Holmes, say, does not. These entities
are intentional, but not purely intentional; they do not depend for their
constitution purely upon the activities of consciousness but have a
second existential foundation, namely in the real world itself.
27. Thus F. A. Hayek writes: “The social complexes, the social wholes which the
historian discusses, are never found ready given as are the persistent structures in the
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Trivial examples of entities which belong in these strata would be higher
order social, political and geographical entities such as universities,
parishes, nation-states, armies, military alliances, the North Sea, and so
on, all of them the reflections of conscious demarcations of various
kinds, mediated, to a greater or lesser extent, by structures such as
constitutions, treaties and admirality charts. 
Consider the complex system of states and events which was the
Franco-Prussian war. We are all familiar with the truism that all that
really exists here, exists that is to say, on the level of autonomous reality,
are the individual participants in and victims of the war, together with
their weapons and fitments, clods of earth, horses, maps, order papers
and so on, these participants undergoing various complex interrelated
processes: issuing commands (causing certain vibrations in the air),
dying by being trampled underfoot, and so on. In contrast to this the
platoons, battalions, divisions, regiments and armies do not really exist,
and nor a fortiori do the campaigns, battles, retreats and tactical
manoeuvres, even though they are all entities about which not only later
historians but also, from various points of view, the individual
participants of the war were accustomed to speak. This is because all
such object-entities have no place alongside the soldiers and their
individual panics, the cannonballs and their individual trajectories, as
these exist squarely embedded in the temporally unfolding world of
autonomous reality. Certainly battles and battalions depend,
ontologically, upon the existence of and upon the interrelationships
between the various individual object-entities which are embedded in
that world, but they depend also upon various demarcatory ordering
principles and various knowledge-interests of participant conscious
subjects either having been brought into play there already, in the thick
of the battle, or being brought into play retrospectively, in historical
texts.27 Now it may be possible to show that all that can be said about
organic (animal or vegetable) world. They are created by him by an act of
construction or interpretation – a construction which for most purposes is done
spontaneously and without any elaborate apparatus.” (“The Facts of the Social
Sciences”, Ethics, 54, 1943, 1–13 as repr. in Individualism and Economic Order,
London: Routledge, 1949, p. 72). 
28. Note that since, as Ingarden points out (StEW, II/1, Ch. IX), intentional objects
have no causal relationships, except insofar as these are acquired, derivatively, from
the lower-order autonomous individual objects which support them, it follows that
the ontology here presented is perfectly consistent with the principles of
methodological individualism defended by Hayek, loc. cit. (cf. also Pt. I of his The
Counter-Revolution of Science, 1955, Glencoe: The Free Press). 
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these various higher-order object-entities taken ontologically seriously
can be re-said in an ontologically reduced language in which reference
is made only to certain façons de parler on the part of, say, military
historians. Yet such a historian would justly complain if his discipline
were crippled by the imposition of this reduced language as the proper
medium of historical investigation.28 
Unfortunately the military historian, like, say, the medical scientist
and the literary theorist, has been little heard amongst philosophers, very
few of whom have recognised the need for the kind of stratified ontology
which would be needed to take his discipline and indeed every
conceivable discipline ontologically seriously. Indeed, even the natural
sciences, which take as their subject-matter the autonomous real world
(thus far accepted here as being ontologically unproblematic),
presuppose an intrinsic stratification of that world, the ill-consequences
of which, in the form of massive theoretical complexities, are mitigated
only by the fact that these sciences develop in relative isolation from
each other. 
Consider, say, a real apple which sits, qua apple, in the perceptual
geographical space with which we are all of us familiar for the whole of
our waking life. Still within the perceptual/geographical space we can
distinguish either directly or by inference various properites of the apple:
being red, being shiny, having such and such a mass, and so on. Now
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there is a division which can be made amongst such properties, between
those which are ‘exterior’ to the apple in being open to immediate
determination (e.g. by turning the apple in my hand), and those which
are ‘interior’ including, e.g. the properties of its core, (being rotten, being
brown, having four pips, and so on). All of these properties of the core
are, so to speak, ‘behind’ the immediately visible properties of the apple
as an apparently healthy, undissected whole, in a purely
perceptual/geographical sense of ‘behind’. But there is another, more
general sense of ‘behind’ according to which e.g. the properties of the
individual cells and cell-tissue which make up the apple are ‘behind’
those medium-scale properties so far discussed, whether interior or
exterior. This deeper-going ‘behindness’ we can represent – in awareness
of the metaphor imposed by the need always to work within the
29. It might even be necessary to acknowledge, on the ‘higher’ intentional side of
things now, a peculiar pomological space, founded by the totality of autonomous
individual fruits which we encounter, horticulturally and gastronomically, as these
are ordered by our conscious demarcatory acts of fruit classification, acts which are
neither wholly arbitrary nor wholly non-arbitrary. 
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dimensions of perceptual/geographical space – by regarding what might
be somewhat misleadingly called the micro-biological ‘apple’, that is, the
relevant totality of individual cells with their properties and relations, as
below the perceptual, edible apple, the latter being founded by or
constituted out of the former.
Similarly the constituents of B, the micro-biological apple, are each of
them founded by chemical molecules, each of which is in turn an
autonomous individual in its own right, having its own autonomous
chemical properties, relations and so on, and we may label the
appropriately delineated area of chemical space as ‘C’. 
Clearly it is possible that we may have to go on to distinguish one or
more physical spaces – not ‘below’ the chemical space (except for the
purposes of the present diagram): physical space would rather be, so to
speak, folded up inside chemical space, eingefaltet, eingeschmolzen, in
complex ways expressed e.g. by the formulae of physical chemistry.29
There is an important temptation with respect to the autonomous
strata which make up the real world, a temptation which lies at the root
of Ockhamist reductionism. This is the temptation to suppose that A, B,
C, and so on are one and the same object, conceived from different
points of view, that ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘C’, ... are co-referential singular terms,
embedded in different vocabularies. This ignores the fact that what we
call, e.g. B, is in fact an intentional object created by our synthetic
activity, with no autonomous status within micro-biological space itself
at all. Of course A – which is autonomous – is coincident with the area
30. The failure to recognise any difference between the two relations of coincidence
and identity lies at the root of e.g. Geach’s early rejection of the notion of absolute
identity in favour of various non-absolute identities relativised either to ‘sorts’ or to
what are, in our terms, ontological strata. See Geach, Reference and Generality,
Emended edition, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1968, p. 34. 
31. Cf. StEW, II/1, §§ 39–42.
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of micro-biological space which we delineate in our use of ‘B’, but
coincidence is a quite different relation from identity, even though it is
in general possible to fudge the consequences of the differences which
are involved.30
The totality of object-entities, including, we must remember, not only
individual and higher order objects but also, say, properties, states and
events, stratified, in complex ways, into regions, might be called
ontological space (as opposed to logical space which is the totality of
meaning-entities). The task of formal ontology, then, is to provide a
formal logical language, a great mirror, which is sufficiently fine to
reflect all of the distinctions which this laminated ontological space
involves.
§ 4. The Formal Ontology of Negative States of Affairs
What follows is a sketch only of certain elements of some future
ontological analysis of states of affairs. Our attention will be directed
exclusively to the states of autonomous individual objects such as this
piece of chalk. We might imagine an autonomous individual object after
the pattern of an autonomous individual orange; the autonomous
properties of such an object play the role of segments bound together in
diverse ways to constitute the object as a whole.31 But where, in a typical
orange, there is only one bank of separable segments, each an object in
its own right, objects in general consist – from the point of view of
property theory – of myriads of systems of inseparable ‘segments’,
ranged together or folded inside each other in the complex ways hinted
32. Here italicisation of sentences corresponds to the execution of a process of statal
abstraction which turns sentences into names (of states of affairs) as, e.g. class
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at in our discussion, above, of the various autonomous strata of the real
world. Whenever, in approaching a piece of chalk, I ascertain that it has
some property or other, say of being white, I unfold in my mind, as it
were, one of its property-segments, and this possibility of unfolding an
autonomous property of the piece of chalk corresponds to the
subsistence, in the ontological orbit of the chalk, of a particular positive
state of affairs, the being-white of the chalk. This state of affairs is an
object-entity which subsists autonomously, that is to say, with the same
objectivity as the chalk and its property of being white; it subsists, in
particular, independently of any acts of recognition or apprehension on
the parts of conscious subjects. 
The interest of modern analytic philosophers in states of affairs has
generally been motivated by semantic considerations. States of affairs
are introduced as truth-makers having a status which is derivative
relative to that of the sentences which they make true. For certain states
of affairs this account has, as we shall see, much to recommend it. But
I want to argue that for the case of an autonomously subsisting, positive,
predicatively formed state of affairs such as this chalk is white, the statal
entity involved exists, purely and simply, prior to any sentence-forming
operations on our part, and that states of affairs of this type would still
exist even in a world which was wholly denuded of intellects, language-
using or otherwise. 
One reservation has to be made concerning such a claim, however.
For consider a typical group of such positive autonomous states of
affairs, say:
this chalk is white
this chalk is pearly white
this chalk is creamy white
this chalk is lactescent.32
abstraction turns predicates into names (of classes of objects which belong to the
extensions of the given predicates). 
33. (Which it would be one of the tasks of the future ontological theory to determine
more precisely). 
34. StEW, II/1, p. 284, my translation.
35. P.F. Strawson, “Truth”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary
volume,, 1950, as repr. in Logico-Linguistic Papers, London: Methuen, 1971, p. 197.
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What must be noted is that we do not have four distinct states of affairs
side-by-side, like matches in a box. To suppose that there were four,
separately existing states, would be simply to be misled by the
separateness of the four sentences; for whilst the sentences are strictly
demarcated from each other, the corresponding ‘states’ are rather fused
together, in complex ways.33 As Ingarden puts it:
... the states subsisting in an object itself are not demarcated from each
other in the way that they seem to be when we consider them as the
correlates of a manifold of different types of assertative sentences
involving reference to that object. The relative self-containedness of the
sentences – even when these are connected together – carries with it an
intentional demarcation of the individual states of affairs.34
But whilst the demarcation of states imposed by our sentences is
intentional, the underlying positive statal fabric is still autonomous. This
yields an answer to certain initially very tempting arguments against the
possibility of an ontology of autonomous states of affairs. Strawson, for
example, claimed that since, if you peel the statements off the world you
thereby also peel the fact off it too, it must follow that facts are to be
regarded as enjoying a merely secondary existence as reflections of our
sentences.35 Strawson’s error was to mistake the dependence of the
36. See Küng, “Concrete and Abstract Properties”, Notre Dame Journal of Formal
Logic, 5, 1964, 31–36. 
37. Schriften, p. 96, my trans.
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demarcation of states upon sentential grammar and upon the conscious
meaning-acts in which sentences are constructed, for a dependent
existence of the underlying statal fabric. 
From our point of view, then, positive states of affairs exist
autonomously, even though they are bundled together as fabrics or
Verbände, having a structure which our individual sentences do not yet
succeed in reproducing. Such autonomous states subsist as constituents
of the real spatio-temporal world; they are determinately formed
‘wholes’ consisting of the objects, properties and relations – concrete
properties and relations36 – which are their underlying ontological
material. What, now, of negative states of affairs? Reinach adopted the
view that negative states of affairs too must subsist, with precisely the
same objectivity as positive states, for their subsistence seems to be
irreducibly tied to that of positive states through logical laws.
The judged negative state of affairs corresponding to “3 is not smaller than
2” stands [Reinach tells us] in a relationship of necessary amalgamation
with that which corresponds to “3 is greater than 2”, an amalgamation of
such a type that with the subsistence of the one is immediately given the
subsistence of the other.37
Similarly the negative state of affairs this chalk is not black appears to
be bound up in a relationship of necessary amalgamation with this chalk
is white, and parallel relationships can be found for every true
predication, positive or negative, which can be made about the chalk. 
There is something worrying about Reinach’s claim, however. Indeed
Russell tells us that when, in his lectures in Harvard, he defended this
same view, that negative facts subsist with the same objectivity as
38. “The Philosophy of Logical Atomism”, The Monist, 28, 29, 1918–19, as repr. in
R.C. Marsh, ed., Logic and Knowledge. Essays 1901–1950, London: Allen and
Unwin, 1956, p. 211. 
39. Cf. StEW, II/1, § 53, esp. e.g. pp. 295 f.
40. StEW, II/1, loc. cit.
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positive facts, this ‘nearly caused a riot.’38 The members of Russell’s
audience reveal, in this, that they have healthy ontological intuitions.
What I want to do is to try to show how such intuitions can be secured
when appeal is made to the ontological theory which is put forward by
Ingarden. 
It is right to say that the positive state of affairs this chalk is white
subsists autonomously, Ingarden argues, because here all of the
constituents of the state, that is, the chalk, its property of being white,
and the nexus of instantiation between the two, themselves subsist
autonomously within the ontological orbit of the object in question,
capable of being ‘unfolded’ by any subject who has experience of the
chalk.39 Consider, now, the negative state of affairs this chalk is not
vermillion. Here whilst the chalk itself exists autonomously, the property
involved is only thought or intended, it is carried into the situation from
outside as an intentional projection e.g. of our acts of questioning or
surmising about the colour of the chalk.40 Thus the state of affairs which
consists of the chalk and its not being vermillion is the result of a certain
kind of intentional demarcation by a given subject. All of this goes to
show that that negative state belongs to the strata, considered above, of
those intentional object-entities which, whilst corresponding to
autonomous determinations of the real spatio-temporal world which
underlie them, are yet not constituents of that world, but intentional
projections laid over it by consciousness as a result of the various
cognitive interests which it brings into play. Negative states of affairs,
41. StEW, II/1, p. 308, my trans.
42. Cf. StEW, II/1, pp. 314 f, et passim.
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Ingarden suggests, may perhaps be compared to shadows, which so to
speak lie behind an object as soon as a source of light is cast upon it:
Their direction, size and form are co-determined by this source of light and
then also of course by the form of the object itself. In just this fashion
negative states of affairs are called forth and determined, on the one hand
by the subsistence of corresponding positive states of affairs in the given
object and on the other hand by the interests which a given cognitive
subject has in a particular range of determinations of that object ... The
subject makes up the deficiency which he finds in the object intentionally,
by means of negative states in which the separation from the object of
certain material determinations is brought into light.41
Negative states of affairs are not the only object-entities which have
this kind of double existential foundation in belonging to ‘extensions’,
brought about by particular conscious activities, of the ontological orbits
of given individual objects. Consider, for example, disjunctive and
conjunctive, conditional and counterfactual states of affairs, states of
affairs projected into the future, and states corresponding to empirical
possibilities of a given object (in so far as these are reflections of our
current knowledge of what is possible for that object).42 And consider
further the various parallel categories of properties, events, processes,
relations and so on which also belong in our ‘non-purely-intentional
strata’, in being projections of various types of intellectual concerns
relative to particular autonomous object-domains. In each case we have
certain ‘penumbra’ which, as a result of our knowledge and interests and
of the linguistic machinery which we have to hand at any given stage, are
projected intentionally around the individual objects which we
encounter. It has been the contribution of Ingarden that he has uncovered
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something of the structure of these penumbral fabrics of janus-faced
entities, and that he has taken seriously the fact that we are all of us, all
the time, related to such entities in our intellectual dealings with the
world. 
